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Key points 
1. The events currently taking place in Central Asia, as well as those in the 
entirety of the post-Soviet area, show that 2014 will be a turning point in 
region’s most recent history, as was 1991 (the fragmentation of the USSR, 
the establishment of five independent states) and 2001 (the beginning of 
Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan). The ISAF mission in Af-
ghanistan and the Western military presence in Central Asia related to it 
were the cause of global interest in the region during the last thirteen years 
and the cessation of this activity will be the most important change. No 
less important will be the repercussions of the Ukrainian crisis, including 
the influence it bears on Russia’s policy towards Central Asia, for exam-
ple in the dimension of Russian pressure on the reintegration of the post-
Soviet area. The above events will significantly influence the geopolitical 
situation in the region, including one of its most important elements – the 
sphere of security.
2. The balance of thirteen years of a Western military and political presence 
– first of all this means the US, with a secondary role played by the EU and 
selected Western European states – in Central Asia can be judged as mod-
erately positive. The West did accomplish its immediate tactical goal of se-
curing a logistical base for its mission in Afghanistan, but it was unable to 
generate a geopolitical change which would enable a lasting independence 
of the region’s states from Russia, their democratisation and increased co-
operation in the energy sphere with Central Asia. From the point of view 
of the states of Central Asia the most significant effect of the Western 
presence in the region was the temporary overcoming of their peripheral 
status and almost full dependence on Russia, and it also confirmed the re-
gional order shaped during Soviet times (the existence of five states with 
their current borders). Intensive cooperation with the West had a positive 
impact on the empowerment of these states on the international arena, 
on strengthening the state structures, and it also improved their sense 
of security. It did not contribute to solving chronical internal problems, 
though, including those in the area of security. Western involvement 
also indirectly led to a strengthening of China’s position in Central Asia, 
which was made possible by breaking down the Russian monopoly on in-
fluence in the region, initiating cooperation between the Central Asian 
states and partners other than Russia, and finally by Moscow viewing 
Beijing as a tactical ally in the struggle against the Western presence 
in Central Asia.
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3. Despite oft-voiced concerns, the cessation of the mission in Afghanistan 
and the Western military presence in the region is rather unlikely to lead 
to an increased risk of destabilisation stemming from the Afghan direc-
tion, since the internal problems of Central Asia have a much greater po-
tential for destabilisation. The most severe of these include: the weakness 
and corruption of state structures, the authoritarian political system pre-
sent in most of the countries, unresolved issues of the succession of power 
(which can generate political severe turmoil), huge socio-economic prob-
lems (unemployment, poverty, the collapse of public health and education, 
dynamic demographic growth); rising ethnic conflicts (for example conflict 
between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks); Islamic radicalism; conflicts between the re-
gional states, including conflicts for diminishing water supplies (especially 
between Uzbekistan and upstream Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan); unresolved 
border disputes etc. The multitude and complexity of problems means that 
Central Asia is a time bomb.
4. The end of the Western military presence in Central Asia will mean the 
West’s influence on the security sphere in the region will be marginalised 
and it will also actually withdraw from the geopolitical rivalry. It is mainly 
a result of a lack of political will in West itself, including the USA. With re-
gard to the architecture of security, a more active stance from China should 
not be expected – despite the great importance that Central Asia’s stability 
has for the security of Chinese interests, Beijing is unwilling to confront 
Russia; is aware of its own limitations in this sphere and views the United 
States as its main global rival. In a timeframe of the next few years, Rus-
sia’s policy will be the decisive factor influencing the security system in 
Central Asia. One of Russia’s goals will be a drive to strengthen its military 
presence and to widen cooperation within the Collective Security Treaty 
Organisation (CSTO) in order to bring the region under an institutional se-
curity umbrella.
5. Although it is likely that Russia will dominate the dimension of Central 
Asia’s security architecture, this will not be synonymous with Russia tak-
ing over actual responsibility for security and certainly not with it under-
taking efforts to solve regional problems. It is a result of Russia’s percep-
tion of the region and Russia’s capability there. Contrary to official Russian 
rhetoric, the threats to the security of Central Asia do not constitute threats 
for Russia itself, and it views security in the region in geopolitical terms. 
To date Moscow has not undertaken any significant measures aimed at 
countering threats to regional security. Furthermore, the effectiveness of 
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instruments which Russia can utilise should a serious threat to security oc-
cur is doubtful. The security system dominated by Russia will not be a sys-
tem guaranteeing security, but rather a mechanism of Russian control over 
Central Asia.
6. The balance of power in the security dimension will significantly influence 
the geopolitical rivalry in the region, but it will not determine it since Rus-
sian potential in other spheres is limited. The most important factor shap-
ing the situation in Central Asia will be Russian-Chinese competition, not 
confrontation, which would be too costly for both the sides. In the security 
dimension Central Asia remains a permanently unstable region, troubled 
by chronic problems and cyclical shocks. The risk of them developing into 
a crisis capable of destroying the post-Soviet regional order does not seem 
high, but it cannot be entirely ruled out. Simultaneously, Central Asia, 
which remains a de facto Russian-Chinese condominium, will most prob-
ably again turn into a peripheral region from a global power balance point 
of view, with stagnation in the political and social dimensions.
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introduction
The goal of this publication is to attempt to assess the thirteen years (2001- 
-2014) of the West’s military presence in the countries of post-Soviet Central 
Asia, closely associated with the ISAF and OEF-A (Operation Enduring Free-
dom – Afghanistan) missions in Afghanistan. There will also be an analysis 
of the actual challenges for the region’s stability after 2014. The current and 
future security architecture in Central Asia will also be looked at closely, as 
will the actual capabilities to counteract the most serious threats within its 
framework. The need to separately handle the security system in Central Asia 
and security as such is dictated by the particularities of political situation in 
the region, the key mechanism of which is geopolitics understood as global su-
perpower rivalry for influence with a secondary or even instrumental role of 
the five regional states, while ignoring their internal problems. Such an ap-
proach is especially present in Russia’s perception of Central Asia, as it views 
security issues in geopolitical categories. Because of this, security analysis in 
the Central Asian region requires a broader geopolitical context, which was 
taken into account in this publication.
The first part investigates the impact of the Western (primarily US) military 
and political presence on the region’s geopolitical architecture between 2001 
and 2014. The second chapter is an attempt to take an objective look at the real 
challenges to regional security after the withdrawal of the coalition forces 
from Afghanistan, while the third chapter is dedicated to analysing the prob-
able course of events in the security dimension following 2014.
The accuracy of predictions time-wise included in the below publication does 
not exceed three to five years due to the dynamic developments in Central Asia 
and its immediate vicinity (the former Soviet Union, Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
Iran), and because of the large degree of unpredictability of policies of one of 
the key regional actors – Russia (both in the terms of its activity on the inter-
national arena, and its internal developments).
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i. closing balance: thirteen years of a Western 
military presence in central asia 
The launch of military-political cooperation between the West and the states of 
Central Asia which took place after the September 11th 2001 attacks, combined 
with appearance of a Western military presence, was a turning point for the 
region. Initially it created an array of opportunities both for the West and for 
the Central Asian countries. However, during a later period this cooperation 
became more problematic for the West.
The end of the ISAF1 mission in Afghanistan planned for December 2014 also 
spells the end of the thirteen years of the Western military presence in Central 
Asia2. During this period Central Asia held an important, if not key, place in 
the West’s strategy towards Afghanistan, while the West’s goals in the region 
were subject to change, which mainly consisted of a gradual limitation of their 
scope. 
In the strategic dimension the West did not succeed in accomplishing its origi-
nal ambitious goals, yet the Western military presence in the region did impact 
the geopolitical situation in Central Asia and widened the field of political ma-
noeuvre for the states of the region. The West’s tactical objectives, related to 
the support of operations in Afghanistan and securing the minimum regional 
stability, were to the most extent accomplished. 
In the security dimension the Western presence did not directly contribute 
to a neutralisation of internal threats for the region but indirectly, through 
strengthening the region’s states, it did enhance their capability to deal with 
such challenges. Furthermore, the West neutralised the main external threat 
to the region, as the Taliban regime in Afghanistan had been viewed in the 
late 1990s. The expected limited American presence in Afghanistan after 2014 
(10,000 troops for the next two years) will constitute further protection for 
what at present is an unlikely threat from that direction.
1 ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) – a stabilising mission under NATO’s com-
mand, operating since 2002. 
2 The French base in Dushanbe (Tajikistan) was closed in 2013, American base in Manas 
(Kyrgyzstan) in June of 2014, while the future of the German base in Termez (Uzbekistan) 
is uncertain.
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1. the goals of the West: evolution and evaluation 
The goals of the Western military presence in Central Asia evolved during its 
duration. The factors which influenced this change include: a concept change 
in US foreign policy (for example the neoconservative vision of George Bush’s 
administration versus Obama’s reset in relations with Russia), problematic 
cooperation with the states of the region, as well as a deterioration in the sit-
uation in Afghanistan. The objectives set by the West for Central Asia were 
both tactical and strategic, and can also be divided into two stages – the initial 
(2001–2005), characterised by ambitious strategic plans towards the region, 
and the later one (2007–2014) - with less advanced actions and focused directly 
on the situation in Afghanistan.
During the initial stage the West’s tactical objectives were to secure the mili-
tary infrastructure necessary to conduct operations in Afghanistan, and 
to prevent the occurrence of terrorism hotspots in Central Asia. These goals 
were achieved – four military bases were established in the region – US bases 
in Manas (Kyrgyzstan) and Qarshi (Uzbekistan), a French base in Dushanbe 
(Tajikistan) and a German one in Termez (Uzbekistan)3. American assistance 
(including military aid4) also contributed to strengthening the potential of 
Central Asian states, while the largest terrorist organisation in the region – the 
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan – lost its safe haven in northern Afghanistan, 
suffered heavy casualties in America’s Operation Enduring Freedom5 and was 
forced to flee to Pakistan’s tribal territories.
In the broader strategic dimension the removal of the Taliban regime in Af-
ghanistan and the appearance of the Western military presence on the terri-
tory of the Central Asian post-Soviet republics ten years after the fall of the So-
viet Union fuelled Western (especially US) hopes regarding lasting geopolitical 
change in the region. Such change was to include strengthening the Central 
Asian states, democratising and transforming them, and eventually also pris-
ing them from Moscow’s sphere of influence, with the West gaining significant 
influence in the region.
3 See further in Annexe 2. 
4 The rise of the level of assistance from US$ 158 million in fiscal year 2001 to US$ 420 million 
in 2002, however only US$ 170 million already in 2004. See further in Annexe 1. 
5 Operation Enduring Freedom – an American operation aimed against Al Qaeda and the 
Taliban supporting it, ongoing since 2001.
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A strengthening of hopes regarding the realisation of earlier proposed projects 
of building export routes for Central Asian carbohydrates was also seen. These 
would be an alternative to export via Russia, especially the TAPI gas pipeline 
from Turkmenistan to Pakistan and India via Afghanistan.
The above goal, in its most ambitious form, was abandoned already during the 
presidency of George Bush6: due to US involvement in Iraq and Washington’s 
subsequent diminishing interest in Afghanistan and Central Asia, and also 
due to problems in cooperating with the region’s countries, which viewed the 
West’s prodemocracy actions unfavourably7. Simultaneously the West’s pres-
ence facilitated the introduction of a new player to the region – China, who lat-
er became Moscow’s chief rival. It is therefore possible to conclude that the goal 
of enabling the independence of the region’s states from Russia was partially 
achieved, yet it was not combined with a lasting and universal strengthening 
of the West’s influence in Central Asia.
During the latter stages the deterioration of the situation in Afghanistan forced 
the West to change its goals towards the region. Western activity in Central 
Asia was aimed at facilitating operations in Afghanistan in the tactical dimen-
sion, while in the strategic dimension it was aimed at stabilising Afghanistan. 
This time the emphasis was put not on direct military presence, but on logis-
tics projects, such as the Northern Distribution Network (NDN)8, which was 
caused by an increase in the number of troops stationed in Afghanistan (be-
ginning from 2008) and problems with the security of supply lines through 
Pakistan. These projects, besides their temporary military value for the ISAF 
mission in Afghanistan, were meant to facilitate the establishment of new 
transport infrastructure and economic links between Central Asia and Af-
ghanistan – therefore serving the stabilisation of the country in the long run. 
Despite the limited usage of the NDN in the withdrawal of ISAF from Afghani-
stan, this goal has been reached. Central Asia did play the role of a logistical 
6 For example Washington’s firm reaction to quelling rebellion in the Uzbek city of Andijan in 
2005. On a tactical scale the result was the US losing its base in Qarshi. On a strategic scale 
the US lost its main ally in the region – Uzbekistan. 
7 Perceiving them as a threat to the regimes present in the region’s states. 
8 Northern Distribution Network (NDN) – a commercial system of transportation of non-
lethal supplies to Afghanistan, operational since 2009. Its route goes from Baltic seaports 
via Russia as well as from Black Sea ports via the Caucasus to Central Asia and Afghanistan. 
The commercial character of the NDN means that it is not the above states, but logistic com-
panies which perform the transportation of supplies. This route was more expensive than 
transport through Pakistan, and therefore was utilised as a back-up, not a main route. 
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base (for example virtually all US personnel in Afghanistan was transferred 
there through the Manas base near Bishkek), while the NDN was a functioning 
alternative for a cheaper, yet instable route through Pakistan, utilised during 
problems with the latter, occasionally taking on the main supply load. Coop-
eration between the states of Central Asia and Afghanistan is ongoing without 
further direct support from the West. An example of this can be seen in the 
plans to build a railroad connection between Turkmenistan and Tajikistan via 
Afghanistan9.
Stabilising the situation in Afghanistan will remain a priority of US policy to-
wards the region after 2014, and relations with Central Asian states will be sub-
ordinated to it. One can expect further American support for infrastructural 
projects connecting Central Asia with Afghanistan and Pakistan, based on the 
American concept of the New Silk Road – a strategy of stabilising Afghanistan 
through facilitating economic contacts with Central Asia. From among these 
projects the most important ones are CASA-1000 (building infrastructure to 
export electric energy from Central Asia to Afghanistan and Pakistan) and 
railroad development in Afghanistan. Despite the crisis in US-Russia relations 
caused by the conflict in Ukraine, it is unlikely that the US will take active 
measures aimed at weakening Russia’s position in Central Asia. This does not 
mean a lack of American activity in the region – the US will continue to deliver 
limited support to Central Asian states (above all Uzbekistan and Tajikistan10), 
yet it will not have an impact on security architecture.
2. impact of the Western presence on central asia 
The Western military presence in Central Asia, associated with the mission in 
Afghanistan, contributed to change in the region. Its impact can be examined 
both from the perspective of the states of the region and the geopolitical power 
balance in Central Asia.
The states of the region are beneficiaries of the Western military presence in 
Central Asia and engagement in Afghanistan. It contributed indirectly to im-
proving their security and stability: despite the fact that Western soldiers did 
9 http://www.avesta.tj/business/26006-tadzhikistan-poluchit-100-mln-dlya-stroit-
elstva-uchastka-regionalnogo-zh-d-proekta.html
10 States which border Afghanistan and thus have the biggest impact on stabilising the coun-
try’s north. Despite that, American assistance to these states is limited mainly to small di-
rect aid and training (especially of border troops and services countering drug smuggling). 
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not directly participate in solving crises in Central Asia, the cooperation with 
the West significantly strengthened regional states on the international arena 
and gave them the opportunity to bolster themselves. 
On the eve of the launch of Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001, Central Asia 
remained in Russia’s exclusive zone of influence11, while countries in the region 
battled such problems as the weakness of state structures, the threat from ter-
rorism12, or the threat of a spill over of the civil war in Afghanistan to Central 
Asia. The fall of Taliban regime in Afghanistan liquidated this threat, while 
the Western military presence gave further security guarantees13, which re-
sulted in the region’s states taking a favourable stance towards the West. 
It did not, however, lead to democratisation and transformation of the region’s 
states, which mostly remained authoritarian (Kyrgyzstan is an exception, yet 
even there it cannot be directly linked to Western activity). Partly as a result 
of the change of the West’s priorities and Russia’s activities, later cooperation 
between the region’s states and the West had a problematic course, examples of 
which can be found in Uzbekistan’s sudden turn after the events in Andijan in 
200514 (the closure of the American base in Qarshi, readmission into the CSTO) 
or Kyrgyz attempts to close the Manas base in 200915.
The states of Central Asia had also achieved significant financial gains due 
to the West’s engagement in Afghanistan. The region’s countries (except for 
Turkmenistan) received a total of US$ 500 million annually for allowing the 
11 An exception to that was Uzbekistan, which in 1999 began orienting towards cooperation 
with the West, especially the United States. In this year Uzbekistan withdrew from the Col-
lective Security Treaty Organisation and joined the Organisation for Democracy and Eco-
nomic Development (GUAM), which included Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova. 
12 For example the Batken crises in 1999 and 2000 as well as the civil war in Tajikistan 
(1992–1997). The consequences of the latter were palpable for several years after its end – 
not all of the warlords recognised the peace treaty and continued the fight. 
13 The latter was especially important to the region’s states – for example Uzbekistan gave 
permission for US forces to use Qarshi-Khanabad (K2) base (the first American base in the 
region) free of charge in exchange for security guarantees against threats stemming from 
Afghanistan as well as combating Taliban and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan guerril-
las in northern Afghanistan. Congressional Research Service Report RS22295, available at: 
http://wlstorage.net/file/crs/RS22295.pdf 
14 Rebellion in the Uzbek city of Andijan in May of 2005, brutally pacified by President Islam 
Karimov’s regime.
15 Kyrgyzstan’s president Kurmanbek Bakiyev in 2009 attempted to close down the Manas 
base (the only American base in the region), after receiving promises from Russia to pro-
vide Bishkek with a US$ 2 billion loan. Eventually the base remained, after a significant 
raise of fees and a change of its name to Transit Centre Manas.
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transfer of supplies through the NDN16. Furthermore, starting from 2008 the 
US has begun purchasing some of the supplies (primarily gasoline and con-
struction supplies) for the mission in Afghanistan in Central Asian states. The 
cost of American purchases made during the ISAF mission can be estimated at 
US$ 4.9 billion17. In total, over thirteen years Western expenses in Central Asia 
related to its presence in Afghanistan came to almost US$ 20 billion18, which is 
a significant figure, yet only a minute part of total expenses related to opera-
tions in Afghanistan, which may even to as much as US$ 6 trillion19.
In the geopolitical dimension the thirteen years of the Western military pres-
ence in Central Asia bore influence on the balance of power in the region. In 
2001 Russia supported the West’s operations in Afghanistan, including a tem-
porary military presence in Central Asia, as it eliminated the threats to Rus-
sian interests in the region which stemmed from Afghanistan. The subsequent 
presence of Western (especially American) forces in Central Asia after the top-
pling of the Taliban, did however provoke fear among the neighbouring pow-
ers: Russia perceived it as a threat to its domination in the region, and China 
saw American bases on its western flank as a new, dangerous quality – due 
to the Manas base, Chinese nuclear installations in Lop-nur fell in range of 
American strike aircraft and listening posts. Both of these countries opposed 
this presence and attempted to end the American military presence by putting 
pressure on the region’s states. Nonetheless, it was the rise of statehood in the 
Central Asian states related to the Western engagement that allowed China to 
gain significant influence in the region which had previously been an area of 
exclusive Russian influence.
Both from the perspective of the region’s states, as well as China and Russia, 
a further limited Western presence in Afghanistan (President Obama’s an-
nouncement that 10,000 troops will remain until 2016, NATO’s advisory and 
training mission) is beneficial. For Central Asia it means further containment 
of potential threats stemming from Afghanistan and the possibility to derive 
16 Based on: http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/OPS-No-8-20121019.pdf
17 Purchases of Defence Logistics Agency and General Supply Agency – further in Annexe 1. 
18 Ibid. 
19 http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/study-iraq-afghan-war-costs-
to-top-4-trillion/2013/03/28/b82a5dce-97ed-11e2-814b-063623d80a60_story.html
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short term gains from cooperation with the West20. It is a scenario beneficial 
also for Russia and China, who are partially interested in Afghanistan’s stabil-
ity and fear the negative consequences of instability in this country for their 
interests in Central Asia. Above all, though, they perceive the situation where 
it is the West and the USA who are the guarantors of Afghanistan’s stability as 
being as very convenient for them.
20 Smaller than those previously gained – for example the reduction of American military as-
sistance, also the previously planned transfer of some of the military equipment left over 
from the mission in Afghanistan does not now seem probable (but is not impossible).
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ii. challenges for the security of central asia
The withdrawal of ISAF forces from Afghanistan and the end of the Western 
military presence in Central Asia raised a number of fears regarding the secu-
rity of the region following 2014. The issue most often raised is the possibility 
of the negative impact that the unstable situation in Afghanistan may have on 
Central Asia’s security. This scenario does not seem very likely, which does not, 
however, mean that Central Asia will be a stable region from 2014 onwards. 
The most serious and real threats for the security of Central Asia will, though, 
be the unresolved regional tensions and internal problems in the individual 
countries of the region.
1. the myth of the afghan threat 
The issue of threat for Central Asia flowing from Afghanistan is often raised at 
the political level, both by the region’s states, and also by Russia. This threat is 
associated with risk of the states of Central Asia being infiltrated by the Tali-
ban or other Islamic terrorist organisations (the Islamic Movement of Uzbeki-
stan, the Islamic Jihad Union) in order to destabilise the region and optimally 
initiate Islamic revolution or topple the current governments. According to the 
most widespread forecasts (first of all in Russian political and analytical nar-
ration) such a sequence of events could occur directly after the withdrawal of 
ISAF forces from Afghanistan21. 
In reality the probability of this scenario is slight, while bringing it up is being 
used instrumentally for political purposes. Russia has made use of the Afghan 
threat in order to force regional states into deeper military integration within 
the CSTO, to strengthen the importance of this organisation towards the West, 
and to justify the increase of its military presence in the region. Central Asian 
countries use the Afghan scare in order to coerce Russia and the West to pro-
vide them with more military aid. The situation in Afghanistan does generate 
problems for Central Asia (such as drug smuggling, trans-border crime etc.) 
yet most often they constitute local problems in the border areas, not existen-
tial threats for the region’s states.
It does not mean that the situation in Afghanistan cannot become destabilised 
or that the ongoing civil war between the authorities in Kabul and the Taliban 
21 For example: http://russiancouncil.ru/projects/project/?PROJECT_ID_4=4#top
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will not escalate, which could indirectly have a negative impact on Central 
Asia. Afghanistan, despite the peaceful settlement of the presidential election 
process and securing of the key issue of signing the Bilateral Security Agree-
ment with the USA, which allows for a further limited American presence in 
Afghanistan, remains unstable. The perspective of a peace agreement with the 
Taliban, which would allow for a political settlement of the conflict, also seems 
to be distant. It creates a danger that the government in Kabul will lose control 
over the country and that the civil war will take on similar scale as in the 1990s.
Nevertheless, the scenario in which Afghanistan would serve as a platform for 
an armed attack on Central Asia seems unrealistic due to several factors. Ter-
rorist organisations affiliating the Islamic radicals from Central Asia (the Is-
lamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the Islamic Jihad Union) which were believed 
to constitute a threat to Central Asia are currently engaged in Pakistan and 
Afghanistan and show little interest in armed struggle in the region22. Fur-
thermore, the attention of the Muslim worlds and groups engaged in or sup-
porting the global Jihad is, as a result of war in Syria and Iraq, concentrated on 
the Middle East23. Also the states of the region are significantly stronger than 
they were fifteen years ago when the region was troubled by raids of Islamic 
terrorists from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan on the Kyrgyz Batken 
province24. 
Secondly, the Taliban, as a strictly Pashtun movement, are not interested in 
spreading their influence north of Afghanistan. This could be seen between 
1998 and 2001, when the Taliban controlled Afghanistan’s border with Turk-
menistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, yet did not organise attacks on Central 
Asian countries. Furthermore, even should Afghanistan’s north fall to the Tal-
iban, it may be expected that the Central Asian states will have the same policy 
towards the Taliban as in the 1990s. For Turkmenistan this would mean re-
taining neutrality and de facto establishing pragmatic relations with the Tali-
ban. Uzbekistan would most likely close its border and support the Uzbek mi-
nority, while Tajikistan would probably cooperate with the Afghan Tajiks, who 
22 Further in: Józef Lang, The Radical Islamic Militants of Central Asia, OSW Report, 2013, http://
www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/report_the-radical-islamic-militants.pdf 
23 This trend will probably intensify further due to the establishment of a caliphate by the 
Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in the conquered territories in Iraq, which resulted 
in a wide response throughout the Muslim world. 
24 Conducted in 1999 and 2000 from the territory of Tajikistan. In 2000 fighting also took place 
in Uzbekistan. 
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constitute a significant portion of the population, especially in the country’s 
north. The appearance of Taliban on the borders of the Central Asian states 
would be associated with additional costs and the risk of instability yet even in 
the worst case scenario of how events could develop in Afghanistan (the esca-
lation of civil war, the collapse of the state structures), the region’s states will 
not be directly threatened.
2. the central asian time bomb
The absence of serious threats stemming from Afghanistan does not mean that 
Central Asia is a stable region. Its instability has a chronic character and mani-
fests itself in cyclically reoccurring crises, local conflicts and tensions. In May 
of 2014 alone there were: incidents of unrest in Tajikistan’s Gorno-Badakhshan, 
demonstrations in Kyrgyzstan, as well as border incidents on the outskirts of 
the Fergana Valley. In the past the region regularly witnessed severe crises, 
such as civil war in Tajikistan (1992–1997), raids by Islamic Movement of Uz-
bekistan guerrillas on Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan (1999 and 2000), rebellion 
in Uzbekistan’s Andijan (2005), two revolutions (2005 and 2010) and the bloody 
Uzbek-Kyrgyz ethnic conflict (2010) in Kyrgyzstan, skirmishes with informal 
local armed groups in Tajikistan (2009 and 2012); terrorist attacks (2011/2012) 
and a brutal quelling of oil workers’ protests (2011) in Kazakhstan, as well as 
armed border incidents (for example on the Kyrgyz-Tajik border in 2014). The 
danger of similar events occurring in the future is high, and it is also possible 
that they will escalate and spread to other countries. It cannot be ruled out that 
similar crises will result in the collapse of the state structures of one of the re-
gion’s countries and the consequences of this would be catastrophic. Neverthe-
less, it is difficult to assess the likelihood of this scenario playing out.
There are a number of chronic threats which constitute a challenge to the 
security of all the Central Asian countries. Primarily these are tensions be-
tween the region’s states (for example between Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan, conflicts over diminishing water supplies in the Fergana Valley) as 
well as internal social, political and economic conflicts in particular countries. 
Ethnic tension (above all in southern Kyrgyzstan) and the activity of criminal, 
primarily drug smuggling, groups linked to government can be included in the 
lengthy catalogue of security challenges in Central Asia.
Despite the region’s states strengthening over recent years, the economic suc-
cesses of some of them (Kazakhstan) or the effective apparatus of repression 
(Uzbekistan), the weakness and ineffectiveness of state structures as well as 
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the political immaturity of societies and elites remain a serious problem. Ten-
sions and conflicts are intensified by the authoritarian political system present 
in most of the states of the region. This system impedes or even eliminates the 
possibility of a peaceful and democratic settlement of political and social ten-
sion, while the lack of mechanisms stabilising the potential unrest, combined 
with the inefficiency of state apparatuses, causes there to be a significant risk 
of escalation should a severe crisis occur (for example the ethnic conflict in 
southern Kyrgyzstan took place directly after the revolution in 2010). In some 
cases authoritarian power itself through its actions generates security threats. 
Example of this can be seen in the problem of the Islamic terrorism threat: 
Central Asia is witnessing a rise of interest in Islam and the practice of this 
religion, including its fundamental currents (for example Salafism), which is 
treated as a threat by the post-Soviet authorities of the region’s states. The per-
secution of Salafists as perceived/potential terrorists, or at times even random 
individuals not associated with fundamentalists, causes people and milieus 
previously not prone to terrorist activity to become radicalised and create a so-
cial base for terrorism25.
Besides the above problems, each of the region’s countries is troubled by chal-
lenges to security and stability characteristic to itself.
The two Central Asian states most vulnerable to instability and volatility are 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In both of these states the last five years have seen 
serious unrest, examples of which may be revolution and ethnic conflict in 
Kyrgyzstan in 201026, or fighting between Tajik forces and informal regional 
militant groups in the Rasht valley in 2009 and in Gorno-Badakhshan in 201227. 
There are a number of unresolved problems in Kyrgyzstan, and even an insig-
nificant incident could lead to these morphing into open conflict. These include: 
25 The problem is present in all states of the region, yet most Islamic radicals from Central 
Asia chose to migrate to countries where Islamic terrorist organisations are active (Af-
ghanistan, Pakistan, Syria). In the ranks of both Central Asian terrorist organisations and 
the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and in Syria volunteers are present from all the Central 
Asian states. 
26 Ethnic conflict between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in the south of the country (mainly in Osh) in 
June 2010, during which 470 people died (predominantly Uzbeks) and over 400,000 became 
refugees. http://www.cmi.fi/images/stories/activities/blacksea/kic/kic_report_english_
final.pdf
27 In Tajikistan after the end of civil war, conflicts between central government and local in-
formal groups (often with a declared Islamic character) took place every few years. These 
groups were in de facto control of the situation in parts of the country difficult to access, and 
in most cases were led by former opposition warlords. 
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socio-political antagonism between the north and south of the country, ethnic 
tensions between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks, the weakness of state structures or reg-
ular incidents on the borders with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, related to un-
regulated borders, especially in the vicinity of the numerous enclaves28. In Ta-
jikistan the biggest threats to stability are security are social problems (high 
unemployment, the pauperisation of the population) currently neutralised by 
mass labour migration to Russia, as well regional tensions, potential conflict 
within the ruling elite caused by increasingly authoritarian course taken by 
President Emomali Rahmon, and finally tense relations between neighbours 
(Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan). Fresh incidents of unrest in Kyrgyzstan and Ta-
jikistan are very likely, while the occurrence of a severe crisis threatening the 
destabilisation of the whole region is possible.
On the scale of region as a whole the instability of two largest countries of the 
region – Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan – is more dangerous, though less probable.
In Kazakhstan, the most stable and wealthiest country of the region, the most 
serious challenge to security is the unresolved issue of the succession of pow-
er after the 74 year old President Nursultan Nazarbayev, who has ruled the 
country since 1989. The president is the key element of the system of power 
balancing in the elite. If the problem of succession is not efficiently solved by 
Nazarbayev himself, there will be a risk of conflict within the elite over the 
division of his legacy. When this is combined with the danger of the occurrence 
of social unrest or Russia’s attempts to exploit this situation, there is the risk of 
a destabilisation of the country.
Despite a significant improvement in the economic situation in Kazakhstan, 
there are economic based social tensions present in the country, which could be 
seen, for example, in strikes in the mining industry. Combined with ethnic and 
clan divisions in society, they create a base for mass social unrest which could 
threaten the government. These threats were visible in 2011 and 2012, when 
Kazakhstan witnessed a brutally quelled worker strike in Zhanaozen (western 
Kazakhstan) and also terrorist attacks took place for the first time. From this 
time the government undertook a number of measures aimed at neutralising 
the above threats, including issues regarding the succession of President Naz-
arbayev. However, the only decisive test for Kazakhstan’s stability will be its 
28 See further in: Józef Lang, Increase in tensions in the Fergana Valley, OSW Analyses, 
2014.01.15, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2014-01-15/increase-tensions-
fergana-valley 
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successful execution29. The problem of extremism and Islamic terrorism which 
has thus far been limited is nevertheless also a security challenge for Kazakh-
stan30. Furthermore, Russia’s actions can also potentially be a destabilising fac-
tor, as Moscow can actively play out or even create tensions in the country and 
region (for example using the significant Russian minority in country’s north) 
to secure the realisation of its political goals31.
In Uzbekistan, the most populous and repressive state in Central Asia, the 
main challenge to stability is also the issue of the succession of power after 
the 76 year old President Islam Karimov who has ruled the country since 1991. 
The situation in Uzbekistan is more complicated in this regard than that in Ka-
zakhstan. Karimov created an extremely authoritarian and repressive system 
of power based on himself and the secret services subordinate to him which, 
with the assistance of repressive methods and total control over society, pre-
vent tensions in the elite from escalating and social discontent to taking place. 
The most likely scenario of succession seems to be a quick takeover of power 
by a successor strong enough to neutralise their rivals and by a continuation of 
the repression and the secure internal stability. At present the most powerful 
actor seems to be the National Security Service (SNB) under the leadership of 
Rustam Inoyatov, who could either take power himself, or appoint a protégé. 
However, another scenario is also possible: if infighting within the elite over 
Karimov’s legacy results in a loosening of control over the society, or appeals to 
regionalisms are made, a significant threat exists that the unrest which has for 
years been supressed could break out and, subsequently, this could lead to civil 
war and the break up of the country. A situation of this kind could be exploited 
by radical Islamic organisations (currently operating outside Uzbekistan). The 
likelihood of this scenario is supported by the existence in Uzbekistan of influ-
ential people, groups and milieus, who may be tempted to assume the office of 
president. During the last year behind the scenes fighting in the elite – includ-
ing in the president’s family – has intensified (for example the liquidation of 
29 See further in: Aleksandra Jarosiewicz, Kazakhstan’s attitude towards integration with 
Russia: less love, more fear, OSW Commentary, 26.05.2014, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/pub-
likacje/osw-commentary/2014-05-26/kazakhstans-attitude-towards-integration-russia-
less-love-more 
30 In 2011 and 2012 Kazakhstan witnessed unprecedented wave of attacks conducted by local 
grass-root Salafists acting in an atomised manner. See further: The Radical Islamic Mili-
tants of Central Asia. 
31 See chapter III part 1, Security architecture: China-approved Russian domination.
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the business empire of Karimov’s daughter Gulnara Karimova and her house 
arrest or the imprisonment of the leaders of the so-called “Fergana clan”32). 
The issue of succession is a key challenge to Uzbekistan’s security but not the 
sole one: the country is struggling under an inefficient autarchic economy33 
and is troubled by tensions between regional groups. Currently they are neu-
tralised by repressions, mass migration and the lack of a real alternative for 
the ruling elite. However it cannot be ruled out that they will be a source of 
unrest even during Karimov’s lifetime (or in the case of a peaceful succession, 
their occurrence will merely be postponed).
Turkmenistan strongly differs from the region in this aspect – in the short and 
medium term perspective it does not seem vulnerable to social unrest or con-
flict within the elite. This is on one hand due to a large turnover within the elite 
(frequent reshuffles and changes at key posts conducted by the president), the 
key role of the president and his family as well as the domination of the Tekke 
tribe, which hinders the occurrence of rivalling cliques. On the other hand, the 
population is passive, indoctrinated and intimidated, which results in a total 
lack of the self-organisation necessary for the occurrence of social unrest. In 
the long term perspective, large social inequalities, strong tribal divisions and 
instability in the neighbouring Uzbekistan may be potential sources of threats 
for Turkmenistan’s stability.
The catalogue of challenges for the security of Central Asia has barely changed 
for a decade, yet the region’s states have not undertaken any serious attempts 
to mitigate the sources of these threats (an exception is Kazakhstan), and 
are only improving their capabilities of reaction once such a crisis occurs34. 
32 See further in: Maciej Falkowski, Political crisis in Uzbekistan, OSW Analyses, 06.11.2013, 
http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2013-11-06/political-crisis-uzbekistan
33 Pauperisation of society, economic-based social tensions caused by such factors as signifi-
cant unemployment and labour migration to Russia; lack in supply of gasoline, natural gas 
or electricity. Uzbekistan’s financial situation is also negative, which is related to its eco-
nomic backwardness: despite large production of natural gas, most of the commodity goes 
to internal consumption, and not for sale (http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.
cfm?fips=UZ&trk=m). 
34 An example of that can be the CSTO manoeuvres, on which complex reactions to social 
unrest (called “orange revolutions”) are regularly trained. Not only the armed forces 
participate in such training, but also other state agencies (police, internal troops, intel-
ligence services) and even analytical centres; http://www.odkb-csto.org/training/detail.
php?ELEMENT_ID=2825&SECTION_ID=188 and http://www.odkb-csto.org/association/
news/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=3134
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The reason for that is the perception of internal security through the lens 
of regime security. From this point of view a limited crisis is not only less 
dangerous than political, economic or social reform (which can career out of 
control), but can even be used to strengthen the leadership. This results in 
a large immunity of the region’s states to minor occurrences of instability, 
but puts them at risk of the occurrence of a serious crisis in the future (civil 
war, fragmentation, collapse of state structures). A crisis of this severity may 
be such that the region’s states will not be able to overcome it, while exter-
nal actors (the West, Russia, China) will not be prone to undertake measures 
aimed at stabilising the situation.
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iii.  opening balance: the security of central asia 
after 2014 
The end of the ISAF operation in Afghanistan and the dismantling of the auxil-
iary military infrastructure in Central Asia create a symbolic turning point in 
the latest history of Central Asia’s states. This closes the thirteen year chapter 
in the history of region, which was characterised by intense cooperation with 
the West, as well as world’s increased interest in the peripheral (due to its geo-
political settings) Central Asian region associated with it.
There are not many signals pointing to a continuation of the Western engage-
ment in Central Asia on the current level. This is related not only to the end 
of the Afghan mission, but first of all to a self-limiting of global ambitions and 
capabilities in US and EU policy, as well as a minimisation of the chances for 
the export of energy commodities from the region to the Western markets and 
the lack of perspective for the democratisation and modernisation of Central 
Asian states. Despite the fact that the issues of security in the region are of 
indirect interest to European Union (mainly in the context of stability in its vi-
cinity), it does not intend to engage in this sphere in a substantial manner. Also 
Washington lacks not only political will, but also efficient instruments for the 
realisation of such plans. The US will continue to deliver limited military aid to 
the states of Central Asia. It cannot be ruled out that, due to the need to secure 
logistics for the small military contingent that will remain in Afghanistan af-
ter 2014, the US will continue to cooperate with some of the region’s states (first 
of all Uzbekistan), but nothing indicates that it will go beyond strictly techni-
cal issues (the use of airspace, lay over landings etc.).
For the security architecture Russia’s actions will be key. This state is deter-
mined to regain its influence in Central Asia, and it has many means at its dis-
posal as to how it can pressure most of the region’s states into accepting its 
notions35. Russia’s main geopolitical rival in Central Asia – China – does not 
constitute a real alternative in this dimension, since not only does it realis-
tically estimate its capability in this sphere – it furthermore has no similar 
objectives. Russia’s goal is to strengthen its dominant position in the secu-
rity sphere and hence gain an important instrument allowing it to retain its 
35 Further on Russian instruments of influence and Russian policy in Central Asia in: Woj-
ciech Górecki, Ever further from Moscow. Russia’s stance on Central Asia, OSW Studies, 
March 2014, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-studies/2014-03-17/ever-further-
moscow-russias-stance-central-asia
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control of the region while simultaneously blocking the actions of its rivals in 
this dimension. Beijing’s priority is real stability in the region. This translates 
into the security of Xinjiang and Chinese economic expansion in the region36.
Analysing Central Asia’s security after 2014 it is necessary to clearly separate 
the security sensu stricto and security architecture. In the European security 
system based on the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation both of these dimen-
sions are correlated (also with democratic political systems). In Central Asian 
conditions, though, such unity is not obvious. It has a great importance in Rus-
sian strategy, in which the security system is viewed in geopolitical categories 
and is therefore not so much an instrument guaranteeing stability, as a tool fa-
cilitating control over the region. The answer to questions regarding the secu-
rity architecture of Central Asia after 2014 cannot therefore be the same as to 
those regarding stability and capacity within the current system to counteract 
against actual security threats.
1. security architecture: china-approved russian domination
Russia’s actions are of substantial importance for the future security archi-
tecture of Central Asia. Moscow’s strategy towards Central Asia fits into its 
overall policy towards the post-Soviet area, based on its imperial ambitions. 
The most compelling examples of this are the Georgian (2008) and Ukrainian 
(2014) crises37. Russian policy, despite its assertiveness, aggressiveness and un-
predictability, is defensive and can be characterised as defence through attack. 
It is grounded on one hand in the conviction of necessity of the defence of “ca-
nonical territory”, as Russia views the states of the former USSR, from Western 
influence (and in Central Asia also Chinese), and on the other hand in acknowl-
edgement of having limited means at its disposal. Moscow’s large-scale activity 
in the security sphere in Central Asia results from a realistic judgement of its 
own capabilities – it is a sphere in which Russia has the largest room for action 
(especially when compared with the small capabilities of influence in the eco-
nomic dimension).
36 Further on Chinese policy on influences in Central Asia in: Aleksandra Jarosiewicz, Krzysztof 
Strachota, China vs. Central Asia. The achievements of the past two decades, OSW Studies, 2013. 
37 Further on Russian foreign policy doctrine: Marek Menkiszak, The Putin doctrine: The for-
mation of a conceptual framework for Russian dominance in the post-Soviet area, OSW Com-
mentary, 27.03.2014, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2014-03-27/
putin-doctrine-formation-a-conceptual-framework-russian
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Moscow’s strategic objective in Central Asia is to regain its influence, to mini-
mise those of the US and China, and to achieve the maximum subordination of 
the local states. The current tactical priority is to strengthen the CSTO struc-
tures38, combined with a further development and upgrade of the Russian mili-
tary infrastructure in the region, and to force the region’s states into joining 
Russian integration schemes (Customs Union, Eurasian Economic Union)39. As 
the end of the West’s military presence in Central Asia draws nearer, Moscow 
has clearly intensified its actions in this area. The new situation created an op-
portunity for Russia to fill in the geopolitical gap, simultaneously providing an 
impulse and pretext for more decisive measures. The Kremlin’s policy towards 
Central Asia is focused on Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan – states 
where Moscow’s position is strongest. The minimisation of activity towards 
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan seems to be dictated on the one hand by the ne-
cessity to concentrate efforts on one sector and on the other by strong resist-
ance from the elites of the above states to tightening relations with Russia. Fur-
thermore, Moscow has significantly smaller capability to pressure Tashkent 
and Ashgabat than it has with regard to the other countries. The perspective of 
the transformation into Russian satellites is perceived by the region’s states as 
a threat to their sovereignty in spite of the strong civilizational, economic and 
personal ties with Russia, the generally positive image of Russia and Russians 
found in Central Asian societies, and – as is case of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan 
(the region’s poorest states) – the conviction about the need to cooperate closely 
with Russia due to economic reasons. The region’s elite fear losing not only in-
dependence on the international arena, but also the possibility to engage in 
unrestrained business activity (something they have grown accustomed to 
during the last 25 years of independence). Contrary to the significant part of 
the pauperised societies (especially in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan) 
which view Russia positively, Central Asia’s elites perceive it as an economi-
cally and technologically backward country, troubled by a number of internal 
problems (including xenophobia and nationalism), which cannot provide them 
with a model of a contemporary, modernising and economically growing state. 
Despite oft-repeated promises made by Russian politicians, Moscow is also in-
38 Amongst the Central Asian states the CSTO members are: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Ta-
jikistan. The organisation’s remaining members are Russia, Belarus and Armenia.
39 Kazakhstan is a member of the Customs Union (since 2010), Kyrgyzstan has applied for ad-
mission, while Tajikistan only voices its interest in the organisation. On 29th of May 2014 
Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan signed a treaty establishing the Eurasian Economic Union, 
which is to enter into force on 1st January 2015. On 9th of October the accession treaty was 
also signed by Armenia. In the immediate future Kyrgyzstan too is set to become member 
of the Eurasian Economic Union.
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capable of offering large scale investments or loans to the region’s states, and is 
far behind Beijing in this field. For example. Russia for years has voiced unful-
filled promises of gigantic investments in the Kyrgyz and Tajik hydroelectric 
sector (power plants in Kyrgyzstan’s Kambar-Ata and Tajikistan’s Sangtuda-1). 
It has also so far not delivered on its promises regarding the modernisation of 
the Kyrgyz gas sector, which it took upon itself in 2013 when Russia’s Gazprom 
bought Kyrgyzgaz – the monopoly on the Kyrgyz gas market – for the sym-
bolic price of one dollar. The economic results of participation in integration 
projects are also doubtful, as Kazakhstan has painfully experienced after the 
establishment of the Customs Union40. The governments also cannot ignore the 
rising nationalist attitudes, which are clearly more and more anti-Russian (for 
example in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan)41.
The above described challenges that the states of Central Asia have to face (suc-
cession problems, ethnic conflicts, Islamic radicalism, social problems etc.) pro-
vide Russia with a wide array of possibilities to exert pressure on them should 
they resist Russian plans for the region42. Russia is also capable of efficiently ex-
ploiting the hypothetical Afghan threat and very strong anti-Chinese phobias, 
and to a limited extent has already been doing so for years. The level of threat 
that Moscow’s assertive actions create for the post-Soviet area was already dem-
onstrated by the military intervention in Georgia (2008) which ended with Rus-
sia recognising the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
It was, however, only the Ukrainian crisis which made a more vivid impres-
sion on Central Asia’s elites. Russia’s stance was unanimously treated as 
40 Frequent exceptions and limitation in free trade between Customs Union countries, which 
allow Russia to benefit at the cost of Kazakhstan and Belarus. Solutions based on the Rus-
sian legal code, what de facto promotes Russian economic entities. See further in: Agata 
Wierzbowska-Miazga, The Customs Union summit: crisis instead of success, OSW Analyses, 
30.10.2014, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2013-10-30/customs-union-
summit-crisis-instead-success 
41 For example: Nick Megoran, Averting Violence in Kyrgyzstan, Chatham House, http://
www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Russia%20and%20
Eurasia/1212ppmegoran.pdf; Kyrgyz rioters chant anti-Russian slogans, http://voiceofrussia.
com/2010/04/19/6613022/; Nacyonalisti opasayutsa vtorzheniya Rossii v Kazakhstan, http://
total.kz/society/2014/03/03/nacionalisty_opasayutsya_vtorzhe; Kakogo nacyonalizma nuzhno 
boyatsa russkim v Kazakhstanie, http://3-sector.org/?p=2006
42 Internal problems of various post-Soviet states (as well as conflicts between them) were 
repeatedly employed by Russia to secure its imperial interests. This was the for example the 
case of ethnic-based conflicts in Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia) or Moldova (Transnis-
tria, Gagauzia), the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan and the 
current crisis in Ukraine. 
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a demonstration of power, determination and capability, addressed not only 
to the post-Soviet states, but also (or even above all) to the West. The reaction 
of the elites was fear of Russia, while that of a significant part of the societies 
– admiration of President Vladimir Putin. A similarly vivid impression was 
caused by the West’s weakness and lack of determination and unity in the face 
of Russia’s aggressive actions.
An especially alarming element of the Ukrainian crisis was Russia’s open ques-
tioning of the fundamentals of the international order on the post-Soviet area: 
Ukrainian sovereignty, bilateral international agreements and finally borders 
recognised by Russia itself. Russian actions towards Ukraine have shown that, 
for the sake of implementing its imperial ambitions, Moscow can break all the 
current norms, exploiting historical, ethnic or any other justification. In the 
perception of the post-Soviet states this constitutes an existential threat.
In exploiting the issue of the protection of the ethnic Russian (or Russian-
speaking) minority residing in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, and coupling it 
with the civilizational/political concept of the “Russian world” (russkiy mir)43, 
Russia has caused serious concern amongst the Central Asian states (especially 
Kazakhstan). Despite a systematic exodus of ethnic Russians from the states of 
Central Asia, the Russian minority still constitutes a considerable proportion 
of the population of those countries44, while its rights are actually, to a some 
degree, infringed (for example in Turkmenistan). The most grave fears are 
those of Kazakhstan, whose northern regions border Russia (mainly Kostanay, 
Akmola, North Kazakhstan and East Kazakhstan regions) and are compactly 
inhabited by the Russian population. The above fears were additionally com-
pounded by provocative statements made by Russian politicians calling for 
a revision of the Russia-Kazakhstan border45.
43 Under the term ”Russian world” a special spiritual and civilisational community of Russian 
speaking people is understood. They identify themselves with Eastern Orthodox culture 
and religion and sharing common values, regardless of their citizenship and ethnic back-
ground. Further in: Marek Menkiszak, op. cit.
44 The percentage of Russians (along with other Slavic ethnic groups) in Central Asian states is as 
follows: Kazakhstan – 23.3% (approx. 4.1 million), Kyrgyzstan – about 6.4% (approx. 350,000), 
Uzbekistan – about 4-5% (about 800,000; lack of accurate data), Turkmenistan – about 4% (ap-
prox. 100,000-150,000; lack of accurate data), Tajikistan – 1.1% (approx. 80,000). 
45 The statements that received most coverage in Kazakhstan were that of vice speaker of the 
Russian Duma Vladimir Zhirinovsky, who called for the creation of a Central Asian Federal 
District with its capital in the city of Verniy (old Russian name for Almaty) and one by the 
nationalist writer and politician Eduard Limonov, who demanded the annexation of North-
ern Kazakhstan into Russia. Also the speaker of parliament of Khakassia (Russian autono-
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Due to Russia-China rivalry and China’s growing position in Central Asia, one 
question is worth asking: To what degree can China be a potential barrier for the 
implementation of Russia’s aspirations in the sphere of security in the region? 
China’s influence in Central Asia is constantly rising – in the economic sphere 
one can go as far as talking about Chinese economic domination. Beijing is carry-
ing out enormous investments, building pipelines and transportation routes (for 
example the strategic project of the New Silk Route, connecting China with Eu-
rope and involving Central Asia), and is intensifying cooperation in the cultural 
sphere, breaking the Russian monopoly. China is also increasingly cooperating 
with the region’s states in the security sphere. Amongst the actions undertaken 
are: cooperation within the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) frame-
work, small weapons sales, limited military assistance for the region’s states 
(financial and technical, including weapons)46, signing agreements on coopera-
tion in the spheres of security and combating terrorism47; training soldiers and 
officers of the region’s national armies (first of all Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan)48. The implementation of economic interests and friendly relations 
with its Central Asian neighbours are not the only goals of China’s policy. Bei-
jing’s deliberate activity (providing loans, developing economic ties, supporting 
state structures, combined with a principle rule of not interfering in the internal 
matters of the particular states) is contributing to strengthening the statehood 
of Central Asia’s countries. According to the Chinese concept, it will contribute 
to regional stability, which is key to maintaining stability in China’s problem-
atic Xinjiang province bordering Central Asia (Uyghur separatism and terrorist 
activity of certain Islamic Uyghur groups). Even the intensification of economic 
relations with the Central Asian states is first of all intended to serve the purpose 
of the economic development of this westernmost province49.
mous republic located in Siberia) talked about the historical affiliation of the north-eastern 
part of Kazakhstan to the Russian state. 
46 For example providing the Kyrgyz army with US$ 6.5 million of rear equipment in Janu-
ary of 2014 http://www.kabar.kg/rus/politics/full/70251, or providing Turkmenistan with 
small arms and uniforms in 2007 – Sebastien Peyrouse, Military Cooperation between 
China and Central Asia: Breakthrough, Limits, and Prospects. Jamestown Foundation 
2010, available at: http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_
news]=36123&tx_ttnews[backPid]=25&cHash=42beea809e#.U2oOwvl_tfc
47 For example the memorandum on cooperation between China’s public security ministry 
and the Tajik ministry of internal affairs; http://www.avesta.tj/security/24486-mvd-rt-i-
ministerstvo-obschestvennoy-bezopasnosti-knr-podpisali-memorandum-o-sotrudnich-
estve.html 
48 Conducted in China – at most twenty people from each state yearly. 
49 Further in: Aleksandra Jarosiewicz, Krzysztof Strachota, op. cit.
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Beijing is becoming increasingly engaged in the security sphere and it is secur-
ing its most crucial interests (Central Asia has not become a base for Uyghur 
separatism or Islamic extremism radiating to Xinjiang). Nonetheless, China 
cannot compete with Russia in the area of creating a security system in Central 
Asia, and does not at present seem to have any interest in doing so. There are 
a number of reasons for that, amongst which key are the following: 
•	 The intensification of the American-Chinese rivalry in the global dimen-
sion, and Beijing’s conviction, that the West is China’s main rival, while 
Russia can play the role of China’s tactical ally. 
•	 China’s conviction that Russia is weak politically, economically and in 
terms of civilization weak and is increasingly dependent on China (for ex-
ample in the energy sphere). Beijing still acknowledges the Russian sphere 
of influence in Central Asia, but is also convinced that in the long term Rus-
sia (perceived as a declining power) will cease to play a substantial role in 
the region.
•	 The lack of tradition and experience (especially in comparison with Rus-
sia and the USA) of engagement in the hard security sphere abroad (bases, 
military interventions). 
•	 An unwillingness to provoke Russia in the region; China fears that Russia 
could destabilise Central Asia (or one of its states) without detriment to its 
own security, if one of its vital interests is threatened by China.
•	 The acknowledgement of its own civilizational and cultural limitations, 
Russia’s advantage in this field as well as very strong fears of Chinese ex-
pansionism present in all of the region’s states. The Central Asian elites 
(to a smaller degree in societies) dislike and fear Russia, its imperialism, 
nationalism and xenophobia, yet Russia is a world they know and are ac-
customed to. The inhabitants of Central Asia are similar in thinking that 
Russian domination does not constitute a threat for their nations and iden-
tity. The Chinese threat, the fear of Chinese expansionism, regardless of 
the rationality of these phenomena, are both existential fears. What caused 
them is the situation in the “brotherly” Xinjiang (the mass influx of the 
Chinese population, which has become dominant over the Turkic, Muslim 
Uyghurs).
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The states of Central Asia are limited in their capacity to oppose Russia (in 
most cases this consists in nothing more than attempts to balance Russian in-
fluence with a Western or Chinese one). This and the specifics of the Chinese 
approach and the absence of signals forecasting a stronger Western (above all 
American) engagement in the region seem to indicate that Russian domination 
in the system of regional security is the most probable scenario. Most probably 
there will be several vectors of Russian activity: 
•	 An institutional strengthening of the CSTO and an intensification of the 
organisation’s activity (military training, possible creation of new military 
units and bases under the auspices of the CSTO etc.), and creating the or-
ganisation’s image as the main guarantor of security in the region.
•	 The development of military bases in the region (mainly in Kyrgyzstan’s 
Kant and in Tajikistan). It cannot be ruled out that Moscow will attempt to 
establish new bases or to take over military objects, including those pre-
viously held by the Western militaries; Moscow has for years strived for 
the approval of the Tajik government for Russians to use the Ayni military 
airport near Dushanbe, previously reconstructed by India. There is also no 
reason to rule out that Russia will attempt to take control over the Manas 
airport near Bishkek, where the American Manas Transit Centre which 
ceased operations in June 2014.
•	 A continuation of arming the CSTO member states50, a monopolisation of 
weapons deliveries to the region by utilising legal mechanisms or intro-
duced by the Customs Union and the Eurasian Economic Union.
•	 Moves to block or limit military cooperation of the region’s states with the 
outside world, above all with NATO and the USA, including not allowing 
the establishment of third party military bases. It is noteworthy that in 
this field Russia has already achieved a certain level of success. A ban on in-
stalling military bases (without providing a definition of what constitutes 
one) of third countries in a CSTO member state without other members al-
lowing it, was agreed upon in August of 2011 during the CSTO summit in 
Astana. A similar solution was preliminarily agreed upon to be included in 
50 In 2012 Russia promised to deliver military assistance (mainly weapons) to Kyrgyzstan 
worth US$ 1.1 billion and US$ 200 million’s worth to Tajikistan. The first deliveries of Rus-
sian weapons were transferred in 2014, but no information is available regarding the value 
of the current assistance and the terms of the next deliveries. 
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the future framework agreement on the legal status of the Caspian Sea, by 
the foreign minister of the Caspian Sea states (Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakh-
stan, Turkmenistan, Iran) in April of 2014 in Moscow.
•	 Probable attempts to introduce Russian border troops on the outside bor-
ders of the Central Asian states (first of all the Tajik-Afghan border)51.
•	 Actions aimed at persuading Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan to join the 
CSTO, or at least to launch or (as with Tashkent) intensify bilateral military 
cooperation with Russia.
•	 An ostentatious, yet only symbolic drawing of China into cooperation in 
the security field under the SCO framework (for example as a countermeas-
ure to the Afghan threat).
•	 A rise in temperature of the external threat to Central Asia’s states (drugs 
and the export of radical Islam from Afghanistan) in the propaganda/me-
dia sphere.
•	 The correlation of activity in the security dimension with the integration 
projects in the post-Soviet area (Customs Union, Eurasian Union).
Furthermore, should events in the region develop (the attempts of Central 
Asian states to develop cooperation with the West, resistance to closer rela-
tions with Russia, etc.) in a direction undesirable for Moscow, it cannot be 
excluded that Russia’s actions will be aimed at putting pressure in individual 
states; an example of this is the use of internal problems, real or fabricated ex-
ternal security threats (for example instability on the borders with Afghani-
stan) or even deliberate destabilisation.
2.  system of control or responsibility for security? 
The real perspective of Russian domination in the field of security ar-
chitecture in Central Asia leads one to inquire about the effectiveness of 
51 Launching actions on the border of between Afghanistan and the Central Asian states in 
order to prevent the spill over of alleged instability northward was announced by, amongst 
others, Russia’s minister of defence Sergey Shoygu on the Shanghai Cooperation Organisa-
tion meeting held in Khujand, Tajikistan in March of 2014. He also suggested China’s in-
volvement in cooperation for stabilising the Afghan border, which could be read as a ges-
ture of courtesy towards Beijing. 
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mechanisms and instruments which Russia possesses to combat the most se-
vere threats to the region’s stability, as well as the will to make use of them 
for this precise purpose.
The Russian military infrastructure already in existence in the region is 
highly developed. Its two pillars are, firstly, the Collective Security Treaty 
Organisation (CSTO), whose members in the region include Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and, secondly, the Russian military facilities in 
the region.
collective security treaty organisation (csto) 
The CSTO was established in 2005, based on the Tashkent Collective Secu-
rity Treaty of 1992. The organisation’s members include: Russia, Belarus, 
Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Between 2006 and 2012 
Uzbekistan was also a CSTO member state. The organisation is formally 
a military alliance, whose members are obliged to provide immediate as-
sistance in case of external aggression on any member state (article 4 of 
the treaty). Within the CSTO framework a Collective Rapid Reaction Force 
(KSOR) was established in 2009, and consists of units available at short no-
tice (the Russian 98th Guards Airborne division and the 31st Guards Air As-
sault brigade, Kazakhstan’s 37th Air Assault brigade, Belarus’s 103rd Mobile 
brigade and battalion-sized units from Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and Tajik-
istan). Another CSTO instrument is the Collective Rapid Deployment Force 
for Central Asia (KSBR) established in 2001, comprised of Russian units sta-
tioned at the Russian airbase in Kant in Kyrgyzstan and the 201st land forces 
base in Tajikistan, as well as other units from Central Asian states. Accord-
ing to the statute both of these can be used to counter military aggression 
and participate in operations against terrorism, extremism and organised 
crime as well as in relief operations connected to natural disasters. Based 
on agreements signed at the Moscow summit in 2010, the KSBR forces can 
also be used in crisis situations on the territory of member states (at their 
own request). During the December 2011 summit, the CSTO states agreed 
that opening military bases of third countries on their territories will only 
be possible after receiving permission from all the members of the alliance. 
In the CSTO framework there are in theory also peacekeeping forces which 
are comprised of contingents from member states. In reality these forces 
are not a common operational unit, but rather consist of ascribed units 
from particular countries.
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The organisation’s practical activity consists of organising of regular meet-
ings and informal summits with the participation of the leaders of member 
states. During these summits joint political declarations are often adopted 
regarding the current international situation, the activity of the organi-
sation’s office led by Russian general Nikolay Bordyuzha (most often this 
means in particular Bordyuzha’s visits to other member states), joint mili-
tary exercises (including those of KSOR and KSBR), Russia’s military as-
sistance to other states (mainly the transfer of Russian weaponry free of 
charge, or selling it at internal Russian prices) and the training of officers 
from these states in Russia, and cooperation in combating drug trafficking.
The most important Russian military objects include: an airbase in the Kyr-
gyz city of Kant (formally its status is that of a CSTO Collective Rapid Response 
Force base; about 1,500 troops are stationed there), the 201st land forces base 
in Tajikistan (about 7,000 troops), a number of military installations in Ka-
zakhstan (for example the Baikonur complex, several training grounds, an 
air force regiment in Kostanay), in Kyrgyzstan (for example a torpedo testing 
area on the Issyk Kul lake) and in Tajikistan (for example the space surveil-
lance complex “Okno”). It is also necessary to mention the joint air defence 
system of the Commonwealth of Independent States, which groups together 
all the region’s states excluding Turkmenistan (Uzbekistan is cooperating 
with Russia in a bilateral format)52. Russia’s actions during the Georgian and 
Ukrainian crises also further indicate that it possesses a much wider set of 
instruments. It is possible include in this both Russian army units and other 
armed services (Ministry of Interior, FSB etc.) stationed in Russia itself, as 
well as various paramilitary and volunteer armed formations with a sta-
tus difficult to define (Cossack formations, ethnic based units comprised of 
Caucasus inhabitants etc.). Even a partial realisation of Russia’s aims in the 
security sphere (detailed in the previous subchapter) will also additionally 
strengthen its position in the region. An important factor which carves out 
the role of regional security guarantor for Russia is also the perception of 
Moscow’s role by the outside world (i.e. the West and China) and, finally, dec-
larations made by Russia itself.
In order to realistically judge whether Russia will play the role of Central Asia’s 
security guarantor after 2014, answer must be found to questions regarding 
Russia’s actual intentions and the real capability to counter threats.
52 Full catalogue of Russian military installations in Central Asia is included in Annexe 2. 
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An analysis of the Russian approach towards security in the region, the per-
ception of the security system created by it (the CSTO, its military presence), as 
well as of Russia’s actions (or the lack of them) in this dimension during previ-
ous years, leads to following conclusions: 
a. Threats to the security of Central Asia do not constitute a threat for Russia 
itself 
Despite the fact that it goes against the official Russian rhetoric of describ-
ing the region as “Russia’s soft underbelly”, it is difficult to put forward facts 
showing the how instability in Central Asia, or even Afghanistan, could have 
a negative impact on the external and internal security of the Russian Federa-
tion. Even the threat of radical Islam is relative, since it is Russia’s Northern 
Caucasus which is the biggest disseminator of radicalism in the post-Soviet 
area, and the Central Asian radical Islamic militants are not interested in tar-
geting Russia. The only serious threat to Russia stemming from Central Asia 
is the influx of Afghan drugs, but this is a soft security threat. Besides which, 
it is difficult to ascertain which is the biggest threat: the one created by the 
huge social problems in Russia itself (including the corruption of the Russian 
state structures and their involvement in the drugs trade), or the one caused by 
the influx of drugs. Furthermore, Russian policy in eastern Ukraine aimed at 
destabilising the situation shows that first of all Russia is not afraid of a zone of 
instability in its vicinity, and secondly that it is ready to create such zones itself 
in order to secure its interests.
b. Security in the region is perceived by Russia above all in geopolitical cat-
egories 
Russia perceives foreign policy (both its own, and that of other states, es-
pecially those from the former USSR) in the category of XIX century geo-
political rivalry over spheres of influence. To Russian eyes, Central Asia 
is a classic example of a sphere of influence – where all activity, includ-
ing in the security dimension, is perceived in the category of rivalry. Ex-
amples illustrating this perception of the region are provided by Russia’s 
emphasis on the alleged external threats for the stability of Central Asia 
(with the “threat” from the West portrayed as being almost as severe as 
that from Afghanistan) in the official security discourse, while simultane-
ously ignoring the internal challenges; or the consequent drive to liquidate 
the Western military presence in the region despite the fact that, accord-
ing to Russian rhetoric, this withdrawal will result in an increase of the 
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Afghan threat to Central Asia and Russia itself. Furthermore, Russia does 
not treat the CSTO as an alliance and instrument guaranteeing stability in 
the region, but rather as a tool for securing its interests and an element to 
strengthen its position in the relations with the West; this in spite of the 
fact that it is a key element in the regional security system which Russia 
endorses53. The CSTO’s failure to react to the ethnic conflict in the Fergana 
Valley in 2010 (with the simultaneous propagation of the ban on military 
bases of third countries in the member states without the approval of all 
allies) may serve as an example of Russia’s attitude towards the organisa-
tion. An example from outside the region can be found in Moscow’s policy 
towards Azerbaijan and Armenia (the latter being a CSTO member state): 
the organisation’s failed to react to armed incidents on the border of these 
countries, while Russia is supplying weapons to Azerbaijan, which could be 
used against Armenia in the Karabakh conflict.
c. Russia has so far not undertaken any significant measures aimed at coun-
tering the most serious security threats in the region 
The last, and de facto only, measure which Russia undertook in order to sta-
bilise the situation in Central Asia was its contribution to end the civil war in 
Tajikistan (the Moscow Agreement of 1997). The other crises which took place 
in the region over the last several years were not met with a decisive Russian 
reaction, and often failed even to rouse Russian interest. Amongst the most 
important of these are: raids made by Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan guer-
rillas on Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in 1999 and 2000 (the so-called “Batken- 
-crises”)54, recurring border conflicts between the region’s states (for example 
tensions on the border of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, both of which are CSTO 
members), Uzbekistan’s tensions with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan regarding 
the construction of hydroelectric power plants in the latter two states (the last 
conflict has even been stoked by Moscow in order to counterbalance the re-
gion’s states against each other and thus keep them dependent). The most vivid 
53 Russia tries to portrait the CSTO as a sort of equivalent to NATO in the post-Soviet area 
and a counterpart to NATO. According to a concept promoted by Moscow, the CSTO should 
be responsible for the security of the post-Soviet area (excluding the Baltic states). Before 
the Ukrainian crisis it went hand in hand with the US Department of State’s post-Afghan 
concepts for Central Asia, which envisioned a main role for Russia and the CSTO, as well as 
increased cooperation with them in securing the stability of Central Asia. 
54 Russia did provide limited technical assistance in realisation of an agreement with the Is-
lamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which was negotiated largely by Dushanbe. Further in: 
Józef Lang, op. cit. 
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example illustrating Russia’s reluctance to engage in a settlement of Central 
Asian problems was when it declined to take measures aimed at stopping the 
Uzbek-Kyrgyz bloodshed in 2010, despite appeals to Moscow from the Kyrgyz 
authorities to deploy assistance under the CSTO framework in order to stabi-
lise the situation.
Russia does play a certain role in stabilising the region, yet it is hard to say it 
does so intentionally. One can first of all point to the millions of Central Asian 
immigrants working in Russia who at one and the same time ease the socio-
economic problems and are also used by Moscow as a destabilising tool (in the 
past Russia has repeatedly both deported groups of immigrants and introduced 
a temporary limitation on their arrival in order to exert pressure on particular 
states, most often Tajikistan). The need to consider Moscow’s stance also serves 
as restraint for possible action from opposition groups or clans against the rul-
ing authorities of the region’s states (this however is also a factor conserving 
the authoritarian political systems).
d. The states of the region also perceive Russian security infrastructure 
in Central Asia as an instrument of geopolitical influence 
This perception of Russian policy is especially strong in Uzbekistan and Ka-
zakhstan, which do not see potential help from Russia in the fight against 
internal or external threats as being much of a security guarantee since it is 
a tool for strengthening of Russian influence or at best the lesser of two evils 
(for example, Dushanbe viewed the Russian border troops stationed at the 
Tajik-Afghan border until 2005 in this way, as did Uzbekistan regarding the 
potential Russian military intervention in defence of the Uzbek minority in 
Kyrgyzstan during the 2010 ethnic conflict). The region’s states therefore de 
facto fear a situation in which Russia would support them militarily. They are 
also unequivocal in not viewing the CSTO not as a classical military alliance, 
but as a political instrument of Russian influence in the region which further 
limits their possibilities of military cooperation with third countries (for ex-
ample the ban adopted in 2011 following pressure from Moscow on hosting 
third country bases on the territory of member states without the acceptance 
of the remaining CSTO members).
Russia’s real capabilities to counter the security threats with the instruments at its 
disposal should also be viewed sceptically; and any permanent settling of region’s 
problems that generate them – all more so. The CSTO’s main task as an organisa-
tion is to protect member states from external threats, yet these are not the most 
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important threats to regional security. It is also important to note that the CSTO is 
an organisation devoid of vitality, which was never utilised according its purpose, 
either at the political or the military level (not only in Central Asia).
Furthermore, this organisation was not established to react to internal cri-
ses or to settle disputes between its members. In 2011 the legal possibility was 
introduced to undertake action for the protection of the stability of member 
states should they be unable to cope with an internal crisis. The formal pos-
sibility also exists to use CSTO forces in peacekeeping missions, however both 
KSOR and the CSTO’s peacekeeping forces can only be used on the request of 
the country affected and so far this option has not been used. Furthermore, as 
pointed out above, most of the region’s states treat any hypothetical Russian 
intervention as a last resort and the lesser of two evils55. The CSTO’s limited 
potential effectiveness in combating threats to security is also caused by the 
fact that Uzbekistan remains outside of its framework. This is significant due 
the scale of Uzbekistan’s internal problems and conflict potential, which make 
it a country key to the region’s stability.
Furthermore, it does not seem that the Russian forces stationed in the region 
(mainly regular army units) are adapted to dealing with threats they could 
potentially manage in the region (ethnic conflicts, the actions of Islamic guer-
rillas, conflict between the region’s states etc.)56. Possible civilian casualties 
could also turn society against the Russian forces (for example in Kyrgyzstan 
anti-Russian sentiments are high amongst some communities) and this could 
lead to further escalation. Due to issues connected with Russia’s internal and 
international image, it seems that the only situation in which Russia would 
be forced to firmly react would be pogroms of the Russian minority in the 
region (hypothetically, they could take place, for example in Kyrgyzstan or 
Kazakhstan).
55 Negative examples of the utilisation of Russian units in peacekeeping missions can be found 
in the Abkhazian, South Ossetian or Transnistrian conflicts. In all cases Russian peace-
keeping forces very quickly became instruments of Russian policy. The stance of Armenia 
and Azerbaijan also serve as a warning for the Central Asian states; these two countries 
were in conflict with each other but at all costs attempted to block the deployment of Rus-
sian peacekeeping forces in Nagorno-Karabakh. 
56 The strategic reform of the Russian army conducted over the last several years, shows that 
Russia is preparing first of all to wage offensive conventional war, not to deal with compli-
cated regional or local conflicts. Further about Russian army reforms: Andrzej Wilk, Rus-
sian army justifies its reforms, OSW Commentary, June 2013, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/
publikacje/osw-commentary/2013-06-26/russian-army-justifies-its-reforms
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The security architecture created by Russia, as well as its instruments, such as 
the CSTO or military bases, are not so much factors guaranteeing stability and 
security to the region, but more tools aimed at strengthening Russian influ-
ence, facilitating Moscow’s retention of control over Central Asia and thus im-
proving its position in its geopolitical rivalry with China. The security system, 
which will most probably be established after 2014, will not therefore translate 
into real security, while threats for regional stability will de facto remain un-
answered.
3. central asia after 2014, permanent instability and the russian - 
-chinese condominium 
In the perspective of next few years, Russian-Chinese relations, along with the 
pressing internal problems, will be the most important factor bearing impact 
on the situation in Central Asia. The probable Russian domination in the secu-
rity sphere will not solely determine the entirety of the regional geopolitical 
puzzle since Moscow has to take Beijing’s interest and growing influence in 
the region into account, especially in the economic sphere. Furthermore, sev-
eral factors indicate that it seems to be in Russia’s interests to be in coopera-
tion with China in Central Asia, rather than in confrontation: due to Russia’s 
limited resources and economic capabilities, as well as the benefits stemming 
from economic cooperation with China (including Russia’s export of energy 
commodities there), and the common perception of the West as the main rival 
in the global dimension. Nor does conflict with Russia lie in China’s interest 
– Beijing is convinced of Russia’s unavoidable decline as a global power and is 
reluctant to provoke Moscow, as this may result in the region’s destabilisation. 
One also has to take into account that for both of these states (above all China) 
their Central Asian policy is only a segment of their global strategies which, 
due to perception of the West as the main adversary, are becoming increas-
ingly congruent. The above alleviates the potential Russian-Chinese rivalry in 
Central Asia and leads to the conclusion that both sides will avoid the confron-
tational scenario since the political risks of this are too high. Therefore, it will 
not be influence in region, but rather rules of cohabitation, that will be the 
object of competition.
For Moscow the ideal scenario would be for it (as a stronger player) to ration the 
Chinese presence in the region – providing Beijing with an exclusive licence on 
cooperation with the states of the region, which are not consulted in the mat-
ter. The optimal variation would see a transformation of selected aspects of this 
cooperation (for example in the energy sector) into genuine Russian-Chinese 
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cooperation57. From such a perspective, the fundamental test of Russian capa-
bilities will be the success or failure of Russian integration projects in the re-
gion (with success not merely indicating that they have been implemented but 
also that they are functioning effectively). On the other hand China, while for-
mally acknowledging Russian domination in the region in the security sphere 
and its political and economic interests, will attempt to develop its direct rela-
tions with the region’s states as far as is possible, strengthening their inde-
pendence from Russia. In this scenario, the most probable outcome for the next 
few years will be a de facto Russian-Chinese condominium in Central Asia, ac-
ceptable to both these states.
In a Central Asia dominated by Russia and China there will be no space for the 
West to play a meaningful role. This will be a result of not only Moscow’s and 
Beijing’s successful blocking of the Western influence in the region, but first of 
all of the West’s lack of political will to engage more deeply into Central Asia. 
For both the European Union and the USA (which latter is increasingly concen-
trated on the Pacific region and reluctant to intervene in the unstable region 
of the Greater Middle East) Central Asia will remain a peripheral region. The 
chances of a return to the 2001 situation and the West’s dynamic entry into the 
geopolitical competition are slight. That does not equate to a full withdrawal 
from the region by the West: the character of the EU’s presence will be pre-
dominantly connected to developmental aid58, while that of the US will be of 
significantly reduced military assistance and limited logistic cooperation in 
the field of supplying and withdrawing the several thousand strong American 
contingent in Afghanistan which is to remain there until 2016 (America’s main 
partner will probably be Uzbekistan).
In the security dimension, Central Asia will probably remain a permanently 
unstable region. Nothing indicates that the chronic problems which trouble 
the region’s states and generate security threats will be settled. Therefore un-
rest will occur cyclically in much the same way as has been the case to date. The 
probability that this unrest may transform into a severe crisis, which could 
lead to demolition of the post-Soviet regional order based on the Soviet heritage 
57 The oil sector in Kyrgyzstan may serve as a hypothetical example of such cooperation. Chi-
na controls an oil refinery in Kara-Balta, while the oil supplies and chain of gas stations is 
in Russian hands.
58 In November of 2013 the EU granted one billion euros in development aid for Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan for 2014–2020; http://europa.eu/rapid/press-re-
lease_IP-13-1119_en.htm
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(i.e. the existence of states in their current borders) or start a long large-scale 
armed conflict, does not seem high (though the situation in Uzbekistan carries 
the most risk). However, keeping in mind the weakness of state structures, the 
relatively new national and state traditions (the current traditions were cre-
ated by the Soviet system, which severed the link to the previous ones which 
had lasted for centuries), and also the dynamic of international changes (for 
example events in Iraq or Ukraine, which can be viewed as attempts to reshape 
the current order in context of existence of states in their current borders), it 
cannot be assumed that the state order created by the USSR is firm enough to 
resist collapse.
Central Asia’s permanent instability will probably be correlated with stagna-
tion in the region in the political and socio-economic dimensions since there 
is no evidence pointing to positive tendencies in the political systems (i.e. a re-
laxation of authoritarianism in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and 
Tajikistan, or lasting stability in Kyrgyzstan), economic or social develop-
ments (an improvement in the standard of living, the creation of civil society) 
or of diametrical changes in the way states function (modernisation, reforms). 
Kazakhstan may be an exception to this, yet its current stability and moderni-
sation attempts could be put in jeopardy when President Nazarbayev departs 
or as a result of closer ties with Russia in the Eurasian integration projects. 
Moscow and Beijing are not open about their rivalry in Central Asia but accept 
each other’s influence there and so for the next few years the region will be 
pushed to the margins of the international community’s interest.
maciej falKoWsKi, józef lang
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annexes
1. Western spending in central asia 2001–2014
Expenses related to military bases: US$ 3.633 billion59
Western aid to Central Asia: US$ 4.329 billion60 
Western military and security assistance: US$ 302.26 million61 
Cost of overflight rights in airspace of the Central Asian states: US$ 732 million62
59 Calculation based on: http://psm.du.edu/media/documents/congressional_comm/house_
oversight_gov_reform/us_hosue_oversight_manas.pdf, http://www.transitcenteratmanas.
com/us/important-documents/132.html, http://photos.state.gov/libraries/kyrgyzrepu-
lic/19452/pdfs/jet-fuel-procurement.pdf, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/
articles/eav051809.shtml, http://www.avesta.tj/eng/business/601-aircraft-tajik-air-tucked-
in-kazakhstan-because-of-the-high-cost-of-jet-fuel-in-dushanbe.html, http://www.caan.
asia/en/show-situation_with_jet_fuel_deficit_in_tajikistan_to_be_resolved_in_early_
december.html, http://wlstorage.net/file/crs/RS22295.pdf, http://www.eurasianet.org/
node/62622, http://www.dw.de/buying-uzbek-help-for-afghanistan-withdrawal/a-16409522 
60 Calculation based on: http://www.foreignassistance.gov/ and United States Department 
of State | Office of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia | Foreign Op-
erations Assistance Fact Sheet, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations 
– http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/cbj/, data from http://www.offene-entwicklungshilfe.
de/ and http://www.bmz.de/en/what_we_do/countries_regions/laenderkonzentration/
tabelle_neu.html, http://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/countries/KG/, http://devtracker.dfid.gov.
uk/countries/TJ/, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/67317/SID-2012.pdf, http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/re-
gional-cooperation/enpi-east/documents/annual_programmes/tacis_success_story_fi-
nal_en.pdf, http://eeas.europa.eu/central_asia/rsp/02_06_en.pdf, http://ec.europa.eu/
europeaid/where/asia/regional-cooperation-central-asia/index_en.htm, http://www.eeas.
europa.eu/central_asia/docs/2010_ca_mtr_en.pdf, http://eeas.europa.eu/central_asia/
rsp/07_13_en.pdf, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-1119_en.htm 
61 Calculation based on: US Department of State and Department of Defence data, available 
at: http://www.state.gov/f/releases/iab/, http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/cbj/ and http://
www.dsca.mil/sites/default/files/fiscal_year_series_-_30_sep_2012.pdf; http://ec.europa.
eu/europeaid/where/asia/regional-cooperation-central-asia/border-management-fight-
against-drugs/index_en.htm, http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/asia/regional-co-
operation-central-asia/border-management-fight-against-drugs/bomca_en.htm, http://
ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/asia/regional-cooperation-central-asia/border-manage-
ment-fight-against-drugs/cadap_en.htm 
62 Kyrgyzstan (US$ 674 million) and Turkmenistan (about US$ 58 million). Calculations 
based on: http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08ASHGABAT552_a.html, http://
www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09ASHGABAT469_a.html, http://www.wikileaks.org/
cable/2009/08/09ASHGABAT992.html, http://psm.du.edu/media/documents/congres-
sional_comm/house_oversight_gov_reform/us_hosue_oversight_manas.pdf, http://www.
state.gov/documents/organization/169758.pdf, http://www.defense.gov/news/jun2002/
d20020607contributions.pdf 
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Supply purchases for the mission in Afghanistan: US$ 4.913 billion63
The cost of the operation of the NDN in Central Asia: US$ 4.62 billion 64 
total for central asia during 2001–2014: us$ 18.529 billion 
63 Calculations based on: http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/policy/policyvault/USA004209-
12-DPAP.pdf, http://www.gsa.gov/portal/mediaId/146311/fileName/Central_ Asia-
Catalog_9_25_12_508C, http://csis.org/event/procurement-and-development-case-
study-central-asia, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/66248, http://www.eurasianet.org/
node/66118, http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/alerts/2013-01-30-alert-sp-13-2.pdf 
64 Calculations based on: http://csis.org/program/northern-distribution-network-ndn, http://
csis.org/files/publication/091229_Kuchins_NDNandAfghan_Web.pdf, http://www.army.
mil/standto/archive/issue.php?issue=2012-06-28, http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/
sites/default/files/OPS-No-8-20121019.pdf, http://www.army.mil/standto/archive/issue.
php?issue=2012-06-28 
us (non-military) assistance (in us$ millions) 
country*/ 
year** 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Kazakhstan 50.2 49.294 55.117 48.396 38.117 34.224 31.251 26.798 21.101 22.422 22.722 120.502 114.106 14.9 12.229
uzbekistan 22.292 27.454 124.198 44.337 38.442 37.805 17.820 15.528 9.497 8.555 12.040 24.858 41.812 12.595 11.592
turkmenistan 8.182 8.02 19.679 8.96 7.898 8.62 5.938 10.874 7.2 8.851 16.512 13.272 9.119 6.725 6.455
Kyrgyzstan 31.648 34.507 73.652 42.416 39.544 34.448 34.714 34.262 29.964 58.932 53.608 55.245 73.890 46.725 51.819
tajikistan 9.976 29.366 90.358 36.536 32.111 43.108 40.403 36.360 31.255 35.765 57.972 51.551 69.374 37.405 36.400
total 122.298 148.641 363.004 180.645 156.112 158.205 130.126 123.822 99.017 75.593 162.854 265.428 308.301 118.35 118.495
* http://www.foreignassistance.gov/ and United States Department of State | Office of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia | Foreign Operations 
Assistance Fact Sheet, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations – http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/cbj/
** US fiscal year.
us military assistance (in us$ millions)
country*/ 
year** 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013* 2014***
Kazakhstan 2.069 2.533 5.207 3.767 4.478 6.469 4.47 5.55 3.601 8.783 9.373 4.505 3.912 3.91 3.61
uzbekistan 2.562 3.255 36.859 9.844 1.907 0.475 0.061 0.016 0 0.283 0.274 0.189 3.034 1.8 1.8
turkmenistan 0.946 1.214 0.054 0.851 0.593 1.046 0.773 0.696 0.45 0.391 2.502 1.121 1.326 1.385 1.385.
Kyrgyzstan 1.808 2.426 11.281 4.747 5.169 3.255 3.075 3.2 2.525 2.205 5.258 3.315 5.734 5.7 5.7
tajikistan 0.423 0.384 3.897 0.526 2.693 0.953 0.858 0.645 1.055 1.416 2.182 2.2 4.721 5.3 5.3
total 7.808 9.812 57.298 19.735 14.84 12.198 9.237 10.107 7.631 13.078 19.589 11.33 18.727 18.095 16.41
* Total military assistance – FMF, FMT, IMET, CTFP, Section 1004, FMS financing, GPOI. Based on data: DoD, DoS| http://www.state.gov/f/releases/iab/ |Congressio-
nal Budget Justification for Foreign Operations – http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/cbj/ | Defence Security Cooperation Agency http://www.dsca.mil/sites/default/
files/fiscal_year_series_-_30_sep_2012.pdf
** US fiscal year.
*** budget estimates
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Total US assistance to Central Asia (in US$ millions) 
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* budget estimates
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450 [US$ mln]
* bu get estimates
Total American aid to particular states of the region 2001–2014  
(in US$ millions)
Kazakhstan: 681
Uzbekistan: 486
Turkmenistan: 151
Kyrgyzstan: 727
Tajikistan: 660
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2. third countries’ bases and military installations in central asia 
Russian military presence in Central Asia65
name of the object location specification
1* Baikonur Complex 
Kazakhstan, 
Kyzylorda 
Region 
Complex consists of space 
launch pad and city of Baikonur 
(under Russian administra-
tion); Kazakhstan has currently 
leased the complex until 2050; 
rockets which deliver orbital 
complexes are launched from 
the pad. 
2
Independent radar node 
of the 3rd Missile-Space 
Defence Army of the 
Russian Aerospace Defence 
Forces – Balkhash 9 
Kazakhstan, 
Priozersk
Specialist radar, part of joint 
rocket-attack warning system. 
3
10th State Testing Range 
of the Russian Ministry 
of Defence – Sary-Shagan 
Kazakhstan, 
north-west 
of the coast 
of lake 
Balkhash
Testing ground. Military air-
port also present. 
4
929th Chkalov State Flight-
Test Centre of the Russian 
Ministry of Defence 
North-west-
ern Kazakh-
stan 
Headquarters located in Russia, 
with three testing grounds in 
Kazakhstan. 
5
Independent Air Transport 
Regiment of the Russian Air 
Force 
Kazakhstan, 
Kostanay
Air regiment provides trans-
portation for the need of other 
Russian military installations 
in Kazakhstan. 
6
Kant Air Base no. 999, 
2nd Command of Air and 
Air Defence Forces of the 
Central Military District 
of Russian Federation**
Kyrgyzstan, 
Kant near 
Bishkek 
Troops stationed there are for-
mally part of the CSTO’s KFOR 
force. About 1,500 soldiers sta-
tioned there. Lease agreement 
is valid until 2058. 
65 Based on: Wojciech Górecki, op. cit.
* Object’s reference number on map on page 50.
** Based on a 2012 Russian-Kyrgyz agreement, all Russian military installations are to be unified into 
a single Russian military base by 2017. Besides the above facilities, several dozen advisers from Russia’s 
FSB’s border troops. Furthermore, Osh also hosts the office of the Russian Federal Drug Control Service.
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name of the object location specification
7
338th long-haul communica-
tion centre of the Russian 
Navy
Kyrgyzstan, 
Chaldovar 
near Kara-
-Balta (north 
Kyrgyzstan) 
The centre provides communi-
cation with submarines using 
long wavelength transmissions 
from the General Staff of the 
Russian Navy. 
8
954th anti-submarine 
weapon testing 
Kyrgyzstan, 
in the vicini-
ty of Karakol, 
east of the 
country 
Testing range on lake Issyk 
Kul, where torpedoes are being 
developed and tested. 
9
1st Automated Seismic Sta-
tion of the Seismic Service 
of the Russian Ministry of 
Defence 
South-
Western 
Kyrgyzstan, 
Mailuu-suu 
(Jalalabad 
Province) 
Seismic activity and worldwide 
nuclear blasts detection control 
station. 
10
17th Radio-seismic Labora-
tory of the Seismic Service 
of the Russian Ministry of 
Defence 
North-West-
ern Kyr-
gyzstan, lake 
Issyk Kul 
Same as above. 
11
201st Land Forces Military 
Base 
Tajikistan, 
regiments in 
Dushanbe, 
Kulob and 
Kurgonteppa
Russia’s largest military base 
abroad; about 7,000 soldiers; 
leased until 2042. 
12
“Okno” Space Surveillance 
Complex of the Russian 
Space Forces***
Tajikistan, 
Nurak, 
southern 
part of the 
country 
Complex serves purposes of 
localising and identifying space 
objects 
*** Besides the above mentioned military facilities in Tajikistan, in 2008 Russia signed an agreement 
with the Tajik government regarding usage of Ayni air base near Dushanbe. The base has so far been 
operated solely by the Tajik side, which is a cause of disputes in bilateral relations.
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american military presence in central asia
name  
of the object location specification
13
Manas Air Base 
(until 2009)/ 
Manas Transit 
Centre 
Manas 
airport near 
Bishkek, 
Kyrgyzstan 
Air base operating from December 2001 to 
June 2014*. Size of about one and a half thou-
sand troops. The base served predominantly 
logistic purposes –the 376th Air Expedition-
ary Wing was stationed there, performing 
tasks of transportation of personnel to and 
from Afghanistan and inflight refuelling 
in Afghanistan. During the earlier period 
Manas also hosted combat planes – fighters 
and close support aircraft (including the air 
force of other coalition countries: Australia, 
Denmark, France, the Netherlands and 
Norway)**. Total cost of operating the base 
(mainly fuel purchases) was US$ 3.183 bil-
lion***. 
14 K2 Air Base 
Qarshi,  
Uzbekistan
Airbase operating from October 2001 to 
November 2005. About thousand soldiers 
strong. The first American base in Central 
Asia. Similar to Manas, it mainly served 
for logistical tasks, performed by the 416th 
Air Expeditionary Group stationed there. 
The base was leased free of chargé based on 
a 2001 agreement on the stationing of Ameri-
can forces****. 
15
USAF Gas and Go 
Team 
Ashgabat, 
Turkmeni-
stan
Small (under 20 people strong) US Air Force 
technical team (from the 455th Air Expe-
ditionary Wing)*****, formally a part of 
the American embassy******. Team’s tasks 
included refuelling American military 
planes flying to Afghanistan with a layover 
in Ashgabat*******. 
* http://bishkek.usembassy.gov/topic-of-interest.html
** Ibid.
*** Based on: http://psm.du.edu/media/documents/congressional_comm/house_oversight_gov_reform/
us_hosue_oversight_manas.pdf, http://www.transitcenteratmanas.com/us/important-documents/132.
html and http://photos.state.gov/libraries/kyrgyzrepulic/19452/pdfs/jet-fuel-procurement.pdf.
**** Based on: http://wlstorage.net/file/crs/RS22295.pdf
***** http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav070809.shtml
****** http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/145765.pdf
******** http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08ASHGABAT552_a.html
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european military presence in central asia
Name of the object Location Specification
16
Lufttransports-
tutzpunkt 3
Termez, 
Uzbekistan 
Small German Air Base located in Termez air-
port, operating since 2002. Up to 300 soldiers 
strong, with 7 C-160 cargo planes and 5 CH-53 
helicopters* (from the 61st, 62nd and 63rd Air 
Transport Wings**). It performs logistic tasks 
for the ISAF mission in Afghanistan (not only 
the German contingent). Germany pays about 
30 million euros annually for use of the base 
(total cost of operating the base so-far has 
reached 223 million euros)***. 
17
French Air Force 
Detachment in 
Dushanbe 
Dushanbe, 
Tajikistan 
Small French Air Base in Dushanbe airport 
operating from 2002 to 2013. Up to 230 sol-
diers strong, with 2 C-160 cargo planes, and 
prior to 2007, 6 Mirage-2000D fighters****. 
Base operated free of charge according to the 
2002 agreement which bound the French side 
to participate in airport reconstruction in 
return for usage of the base*****. 
* http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav090705.shtml
** http://eatc-mil.com/67/Air-Transport-Wing-63
*** Calculations based on: http://www.eurasianet.org/node/62622, http://www.dw.de/buying-uzbek-
-help-for-afghanistan-withdrawal/a-16409522 and http://www.eurasianet.org/node/63999
**** http://www.centcom.mil/en/about-centcom-en/coalition-countries-en/france-en
***** http://www.eurasianet.org/node/66925
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